| 18. QUOD SIT SINE PRINCIPIO ET SINE FINE.
| 18. [The Supreme Being] exists without beginning and without end.
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| Ex quo igitur haec tam simplex natura creatrix et vigor omnium fuit, uel usquequo futura est? An potius nec ex quo nec usquequo est sed sine principio et sine fine est? Si enim principium habet: aut ex se uel per se hoc habet, aut ex alio vel per aliud, aut ex nihilo vel per nihil.
| From what time, then, as this so simple Nature which creates and animates all things existed, or until what time is it to exist? Or rather, let us ask neither from what time, nor to what time, it exists; but is it without beginning and without end? For, if it has a beginning, it has this either from or through itself, or from or through another, or from or through nothing.
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| Sed constat per veritatem iam perspectam, quia nullo modo ex alio vel ex nihilo, aut per aliud vel per nihil est. Nullo igitur modo per aliud vel ex alto, aut per nihil vel ex nihilo initium sortita est.
| But it is certain, according to truths already made plain, that in no wise does it derive existence from another, or from nothing; or exist through another, or through nothing. In no wise, therefore, has it had inception through or from another, or through or from nothing.
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| Ex seipsa vero vel per se initium habere non potest, quamquam ex seipsa et per seipsam sit. Sic enim est ex se et per se, ut nullo modo sit alia essentia quae est per se et ex se, et alia per quam et ex qua est. Quidquid autem ex aliquo vel per aliquid incipit esse, non est omnino idem illi, ex quo vel per quod incipit esse. Summa igitur natura non incepit per se vel ex se.
| Moreover, it cannot have inception from or through itself, although it exists from and through itself. For it so exists from and through itself, that by no means is there one essence which exists from and through itself, and another through which, and from which, it exists. But, whatever begins to exist from or through something, is by no means identical with that from or through which it begins to exist. Therefore, the supreme Nature does not begin through or from, itself.
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| Quoniam igitur nec per se nec ex se, nec per aliud nec ex alto, nec per nihil nec ex nihilo habet principium: nullo modo habet principium.
| Seeing, then, that it has a beginning neither through nor from itself, and neither through nor from nothing, it assuredly has no beginning at all.
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| Sed neque finem habebit. Si enim finem habitue est, non est summe immortalis et summe incorruptibilis. Sed constat quia est summe et immortalis /33/ et incorruptibilis. Non habebit igitur finem.
| But neither will it have an end. For, if it is to have end, it is not supremely immortal and supremely incorruptible. But we have proved that it is supremely immortal and supremely incorruptible. Therefore, it will not have an end.
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| Amplius. Si finem habitura est, aut volens aut nolens deficiet. Sed pro certo non est simplex bonum, cuius voluntate perit summum bonum. At ipsa est verum et simplex bonum. Quare sua sponte non deficiet ipsa, quam certum est esse summum bonum. Si vero nolens peritura est, non est summe potens nec omnipotens. Sed rationis necessitas asseruit eam esse summe potentem et omnipotentem. Non ergo nolens deficiet. Quare si nec uolens nec nolens summa natura finem habebit, nullo modo finem habebit.
| Furthermore, if it is to have an end, it will perish either willingly or against its will. But certainly that is not a simple, unmixed good, at whose will the supreme good perishes. But this Being is itself the true and simple, unmixed good. Therefore, that very Being, which is certainly the supreme good, will not die of its own will. If, however, it is to perish against its will, it is not supremely powerful, or all-powerful. But cogent reasoning has asserted it to be powerful and all-powerful. Therefore, it will not die against its will. Hence, if neither with nor against its will the supreme Nature is to have an end, in no way will it have an end.
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| Amplius. Si summa illa natura principium vel finem habet, non est vera aeternitas, quod esse supra inexpugnabiliter inventum est.
| Again, if the supreme nature has an end or a beginning, it is not true eternity, which it has been irrefutably proved to be above.
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| Deinde cogitet qui potest, quando incepit aut quando non fuit hoc verum: scilicet quia futurum erat aliquid; aut quando desinet et non erit hoc verum: videlicet quia praeteritum erit aliquid. Quodsi neutrum horum cogitari potest, et utrumque hoc verum sine veritate esse non potest: impossibile est vel cogitare, quod veritas principium aut finem habeat. Denique si veritas habuit principium vel habebit finem: antequam ipsa inciperet, verum erat tunc quia non erat veritas; et postquam finita erit, verum erit tunc quia non erit veritas. Atqui verum non potest esse sine veritate. Erat igitur veritas, antequam esset veritas; et erit veritas, postquam finita erit veritas; quod inconvenientissimum est. Sive igitur dicatur veritas habere, sive intelligatur non habere principium vel finem: nullo claudi potest veritas principio vel fine. Quare idem sequitur de summa natura, quia ipsa summa veritas est.
| Then, let him who can conceive of a time when this began to be true, or when it was not true, namely, that something was destined to be; or when this shall cease to be true, and shall not be true, namely, that something has existed. But, if neither of these suppositions is conceivable, and both these facts cannot exist without truth, it is impossible even to conceive that truth has either beginning or end. And then, if truth had a beginning, or shall have an end; before it began it was true that truth did not exist, and after it shall be ended it will be true that truth will not exist. Yet, anything that is true cannot exist without truth. Therefore, truth existed before truth existed, and truth will exist after truth shall be ended, which is a most contradictory conclusion. Whether, then, truth is said to have, or understood not to have, beginning or end, it cannot be limited by any beginning or end. Hence, the same follows as regards the supreme Nature, since it is itself the supreme Truth.
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| 19. QUOMODO NIHIL FUIT ANTE AUT ERIT POST ILLAM.
| 19. How nothing existed before or will exist after the Supreme Being.
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| Sed ecce iterum insurgit nihil, et quaecumque hactenus ratio veritate et necessitate concorditer attestantibus disseruit, asserit esse nihil. Si enim ea quae supra digesta sunt, necessariae veritatis munimine firmata sunt, non fuit aliquid ante summam essentiam nec erit aliquid post eam. /34/
| But here we are again confronted by the term nothing, and whatever our reasoning thus far, with the concordant attestation of truth and necessity, has concluded nothing to be. For, if the propositions duly set forth above have been confirmed by the fortification of logically necessary truth, not anything existed before the supreme Being, nor will anything exist after it.
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| Quare nihil fuit ante eam et nihil erit post eam. Nam aut aliquid aut nihil necesse est praecessisse vel subsecuturum esse.
| Hence, nothing existed before, and nothing will exist after, it. For, either something or nothing must have preceded it; and either something or nothing must be destined to follow it.
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| Qui autem dicit, quia nihil fuit ante ipsam et nihil erit post ipsam, id pronuntiare uidetur, quia fuit ante ipsam quando nihil erat, et erit post ipsam quando nihil erit. Quando ergo nihil erat, illa non erat; et quando nihil erit, illa non erit. Quomodo ergo non incepit ex nihilo, aut quomodo non deveniet ad nihilum, si illa nondum erat cum iam erat nihil, et eadem iam non erit cum adhuc erit nihil? Quid igitur molita est tanta moles argumentorum, si tam facile demolitur nihilum molimina eorum? Si namque constituitur, ut summum esse nihilo et praecedenti succedat et subsequenti decedat: quidquid supra statuit verum necesse, destituitur per inane nihilum.
| But, he who says that nothing existed before it appears to make this statement, "that there was before it a time when nothing existed, and that there will be after it a time when nothing will exist.” Therefore, when nothing existed, that Being did not exist, and when nothing shall exist, that Being will not exist. How is it, then, that it does not take inception from nothing or how is it that it will not come to nothing?—if that Being did not yet exist, when nothing already existed; and the same Being shall no longer exist, when nothing shall still exist. Of what avail is so weighty a mass of arguments, if this nothing so easily demolishes their structure? For, if it is established that the supreme Being succeeds nothing, which precedes it, and yields its place to nothing, which follows it, whatever has been posited as true above is necessarily unsettled by empty nothing.
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| An potius repugnandum est nihilo, ne tot structurae necessariae rationis expugnentur a nihilo, et summum bonum quod lucerna veritatis quaesitum et inventum est, amittatur pro nihilo?
| But, rather ought this nothing to be resisted, lest so many structures of cogent reasoning be stormed by nothing; and the supreme good, which has been sought and found by the light of truth, be lost for nothing.
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| Potius igitur asseratur, si fieri potest, quia nihil non fuit ante summam essentiam nec erit post illam, quam dum locus datur ante vel post illam nihilo, per nihilum reducatur ad nihil illud esse, quod per seipsum conduxit id quod erat nihil ad esse.
| Let it rather be declared, then, that nothing did not exist before the supreme Being, and that nothing will not exist after it, rather than that, when a place is given before or after it to nothing, that Being which through itself brought into existence what was nothing, should be reduced through nothing to nothing.
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| Duplicem namque una pronuntiatio gerit sententiam, cum dicitur quia nihil fuit ante summam essentiam. Unus enim est eius sensus: quia priusquam summa essentia esset fuit, cum erat nihil; alter vero eius est intellectus: quia ante summam essentiam non foit aliquid. Veluti si dicam: nihil me docuit uolare, hoc aut sic exponam: quia ipsum 'nihil', quod significat 'non aliquid', docuit me volare, et erit falsum; aut: quia non me docuit aliquid volare, quod est verum.
| For this one assertion, namely, that nothing existed before the supreme Being, carries two meanings. For, one sense of this statement is that, before the supreme Being, there was a time when nothing was. But another understanding of the same statement is that, before the supreme Being, not anything existed. Just as, supposing I should say, "Nothing has taught me to fly,” I could explain this assertion either in this way, that nothing, as an entity in itself, which signifies not anything, has taught me actually to fly—which would be false; or in this way, that not anything has taught me to fly, which would be true.
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| Prior itaque sensus est, quem sequitur supra tractata inconvenientia, et omnimoda ratione pro falso repellitur; alter vero est, qui superioribus perfecta cohaeret convenientia, et tota illorum contextione verus esse compellitur.
| The former interpretation, therefore, which is followed by the inconsistency discussed above, is rejected by all reasoning as false. But there remains the other interpretation, which unites in perfect consistency with the foregoing arguments, and which, from the force of their whole correlation, must be true.
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| Quare cum dicitur quia nihil fuit ante illam, secundum posteriorem intellectum accipiendum est; nec sic est exponendum ut intelligatur aliquando fuisse, quando illa non erat et nihil erat sed ita ut intelligatur quia ante illam non fuit aliquid. Eadem ratio est duplicis intellectus, si nihil dicatur post illam esse futurum.
| Hence, the statement that nothing existed before that Being must be received in the latter sense. Nor should it be so explained, that it shall be understood that there was any time when that Being did not exist, and nothing did exist; but, so that it shall be understood that, before that Being, there was not anything. The same sort of double signification is found in the statement that nothing will exist after that Being.
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| Si ergo haec interpretatio quae facta est de nihilo /35/ diligenter discernitur, verissime nec aliquid nec nihil summam essentiam aut praecessisse aut subsecuturum esse, et nihil fuisse ante vel post illam esse secuturum concluditur; et tamen nulla iam constitutorum soliditas nihili inanitate concutitur.
| If, then, this interpretation of the term nothing, that has been given, is carefully analysed, most truly neither something nor nothing preceded or will follow the supreme Being, and the conclusion is reached, that nothing existed before or will exist after it. Yet, the solidity of the truths already established is in no wise impaired by the emptiness of nothing.
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| 20. QUOD ILLA SIT IN OMNI LOCO ET TEMPORE.
| 20. The Supreme Being exists in every place and at all times.
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| Quamquam autem supra conclusum sit, quia creatrix haec natura ubique et in omnibus et per omnia sit, et ex eo quia nec incepit nec desinet esse, consequatur quia semper fuit et est et erit: sentio tamen quiddam contradictionis summurmurare, quod me cogit diligentius ubi et quando illa sit indagare.
| But, although it has been concluded above that this creative Nature exists everywhere, and in all things, and through all; and from the fact that it neither began, nor will cease to be, it follows that it always has been, and is, and will be; yet, I perceive a certain secret murmur of contradiction which compels me to inquire more carefully where and when that Nature exists.
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| Itaque summa essentia aut ubique et semper est, aut tantum alicubi et aliquando, aut nusquam et numquam. Quod dico: aut in omni loco vel tempore, aut determinate in aliquo, aut in nullo.
| The supreme Being, then, exists either everywhere and always, or merely at some place and time, or nowhere and never: or, as I express it, either in every place and at every time, or finitely, in some place and at some time, or in no place and at no time.
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| Sed quid videtur repugnantius, quam ut, quod verissime et summe est, id nusquam et numquam sit? Falsum est igitur nusquam vel numquam illam esse. Deinde, quoniam nullum bonum nec penitus aliquid est sine ea: si ipsa nusquam vel numquam est, nusquam vel numquam aliquod bonum est, et nusquam vel numquam omnino aliquid est. Quod quam falsum sit, nec dicere opus est. Falsum igitur est et illud, quod illa nusquam et numquam sit.
| But what can be more obviously contradictory, than that what exists most really and supremely exists nowhere and never? It is, therefore, false that it exists nowhere and never. Again, since there is no good, nor anything at all without it; if this Being itself exists nowhere or never, then nowhere or never is there any good, and nowhere and never is there anything at all. But there is no need to state that this is false. Hence, the former proposition is also false, that that Being exists nowhere and never.
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| Aut est ergo determinate alicubi et aliquando, aut ubique et semper. At si determinate est in aliquo loco vel tempore: ibi et tunc tantum, ubi et quando ipsa est, potest aliquid esse; ubi vero et quando ipsa non est, ibi et tunc penitus nulla est essentia, quia sine ea nihil est. Unde consequetur ut sit aliquis locus et aliquod tempus, ubi et quando nihil omnino est. Quod quoniam falsum est -- ipse namque locus et ipsum tempus aliquid est -- non potest esse summa natura alicubi vel aliquando determinate. Quod si dicitur, quia determinate ipsa per se alicubi et aliquando est sed per potentiam suam est ubicumque vel quandocumque aliquid est: non est verum. Quoniam enim potentiam /36/ eius nihil aliud quam ipsam esse manifestum est, nullo modo potentia eius sine ipsa est.
| It therefore exists finitely, at some time and place, or everywhere and always. But, if it exists finitely, at some place or time, there and then only, where and when it exists, can anything exist. Where and when it does not exist, moreover, there is no existence at all, because, without it, nothing exists. Whence it will follow, that there is some place and time where and when nothing at all exists. But seeing that this is false—for place and time themselves are existing things—the supreme Nature cannot exist finitely, at some place or time. But, if it is said that it of itself exists finitely, at some place and time, but that, through its power, it is wherever and whenever anything is, this is not true. For, since it is manifest that its power is nothing else than itself, by no means does its power exist without it.
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| Cum ergo non sit alicubi vel aliquando determinate, necesse est ut sit ubique et semper, id est in omni loco vel tempore.
| Since, then, it does not exist finitely, at some place or time, it must exist everywhere and always, that is, in every place and at every time.
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| 21. QUOD IN NULLO SIT LOCO AUT TEMPORE.
| 21. [The Supreme Being] exists in no place at no time.
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| Quod si ita est, aut tote est in omni loco vel tempore, aut tantum quaelibet pars eius, ut altera pars sit extra omnem locum et tempus.
| But, if this is true, either it exists in every place and at every time, or else only a part of it so exists, the other part transcending every place and time.
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| Si vero partim est et partim non est in omni loco vel tempore, parses habet; quod falsum est Non igitur partim est ubique et semper.
| But, if in part it exists, and in part does not exist, in every place and at every time, it has parts; which is false. It does not, therefore, exist everywhere and always in part.
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| Tota autem quomodo est ubique et semper? Aut enim sic est intelligendum, ut tote semel sit in omnibus locis vel temporibus et per parses in singulis; aut sic ut tote sit etiam in singulis.
| But how does it exist as a whole, everywhere and always? For, either it is to be understood that it exists as a whole at once, in all places or at all times, and by parts in individual places and times; or, that it exists as a whole, in individual places and times as well.
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| Verum si per partes est in singulis, non effugit partium compositionem et divisionem; quod valde alienum a summa natura inventum est. Quapropter non est ita tote in omnibus locis aut temporibus, ut per parses sit in singulis.
| But, if it exists by parts in individual places or times, it is not exempt from composition and division of parts; which has been found to be in a high degree alien to the supreme Nature. Hence, it does not so exist, as a whole, in all places and at all times that it exists by parts in individual places and times.
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| Restat altera pars discutienda, scilicet: qualiter summa natura tote sit in omnibus et singulis locis vel temporibus. Hoc nimirum esse non potest, nisi aut simul aut diversis temporibus. Sed quondam ratio loci ac ratio temporis, quas hactenus simul progresses eisdem uestigiis una potuit indagare prosecutio, hic ab invicem digredientes disputationem uidentur diversis quasi fugere anfractibus, singulatim suds investigentur discussionibus.
| We are confronted, then, by the former alternative, that is, how the supreme Nature can exist, as a whole, in every individual place and time. This is doubtless impossible, unless it either exists at once or at different times in individual places or times. But, since the law of place and the law of time, the investigation of which it has hitherto been possible to prosecute in a single discussion, because they advanced on exactly the same lines, here separate one from another and seem to avoid debate, as if by evasion in diverse directions, let each be investigated independently in discussion directed on itself alone.
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| Primum ergo videatur si summa natura tote possit esse in singulis locis aut simul aut per diversa tempora. Deinde id ipsum in temporibus inquiratur.
| First, then, let us see whether the supreme Nature can exist, as a whole, in individual places, either at once in all, or at different times, in different places. Then, let us make the same inquiry regarding the times at which it can exist.
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| Si igitur tote est simul in singulis locis, per singula loca sunt singulae totae. Sicut enim locus a loco distinguitur, ut singula loca sint, ita id quod totum est in uno loco, ab eo quod eodem tempore totum est in alio loco distinguitur, ut singula tote sint. Nam quod totum est in aliquo loco, nihil eius est quod non sit in ipso loco. At de quo nihil est quod non sit in aliquo loco, nihil est de eo quod sit eodem tempore extra eundem locum. Quod igitur totum est in aliquo loco, nihil eius est quod eodem tempore sit extra ipsum locum.
| If, then, it exists as a whole in each individual place, then, for each individual place there is an individual whole. For, just as place is so distinguished from place that there are individual places, so that which exists as a whole, in one place, is so distinct from that which exists as a whole at the same time, in another place, that there are individual wholes. For, of what exists as a whole, in any place, there is no part that does not exist in that place. And that of which there is no part that does not exist in a given place, is no part of what exists at the same time outside this place.
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| Sed de quo nihil est extra quemlibet locum, nihil eius est eodem tempore in alio loco. Quare quod totum est /37/ in quolibet loco, nihil eius est simul in alio loco. Quod igitur totum est in aliquo loco: quomodo totum quoque est simul in alio loco, si nihil de eo potest esse in alio loco?
| What exists as a whole, then, in any place, is no part of what exists at the same time outside that place. But, of that of which no part exists outside any given place, no part exists, at the same time, in another place. How, then, can what exists as a whole, in any place, exist simultaneously, as a whole, in another place, if no part of it can at that time exist in another place?
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| Quoniam igitur unum totum non potest esse simul in diversis locis totum, consequitur ut per singula loca singula sint tota, si in singulis locis simul aliquid est totum. Quapropter si summa natura tota est uno tempore in singulis omnibus locis: quot singula loca esse possunt, tot singulae summae naturae sunt; quod irrationabile est opinari. Non est igitur tota uno tempore in singulis locis.
| Since, then, one whole cannot exist as a whole in different places at the same time, it follows that, for individual places, there are individual wholes, if anything is to exist as a whole in different individual places at once. Hence, if the supreme Nature exists as a whole, at one time, in every individual place, there are as many supreme Natures as there can be individual places; which it would be irrational to believe. Therefore, it does not exist, as a whole, at one time in individual places.
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| At vero si diversis temporibus tota est in singulis locis: quando est in uno loco, nullum bonum et nulia essentia est interim in aliis locis, quia sine ea prorsus aliquid non existit. Quod absurdum esse vel ipsa loca probant, quae non nihil sed aliquid sunt. Non est itaque summa natura tota in singulis locis diversis temporibus.
| If, however, at different times it exists, as a whole, in individual places, then, when it is in one place, there is in the meantime no good and no existence in other places, since without it absolutely nothing exists. But the absurdity of this supposition is proved by the existence of places themselves, which are not nothing, but something. Therefore, the supreme Nature does not exist, as a whole, in individual places at different times.
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| Quod si nec eodem tempore nec diversis temporibus tota est in singulis locis: liquet quia nullo modo est tota in singulis omnibus locis.
| But, if neither at the same time nor at different times does it exist, as a whole, in individual places, it is evident that it does not at all exist, as a whole, in each individual place.
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| Nunc est indagandum, si eadem summa natura sit tota in singulis temporibus, aut simul aut distincte per singula tempora.
| We must now examine, then, whether this supreme Nature exists, as a whole, at individual times, either simultaneously or at distinct times for individual times.
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| Sed quomodo est aliquid totum simul in singulis temporibus, si ipsa tempora simul non sunt? Si vero separatim et distincte tota est in singulis temporibus, quemadmodum aliquis homo totus est heri et hodie et cras: proprie dicitur quia fuit et est et erit. Ergo eIus aetas, quae nihil aliud est quam eIus aeternitas, non est tota simul sed est partibus extensa per temporum partes.
| But, how can anything exist, as a whole, simultaneously, at individual times, if these times are not themselves simultaneous? But, if this Being exists, as a whole, separately and at distinct times for individual times, just as a man exists as a whole yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow; it is properly said that it was and is and will be. Its age, then, which is no other than its eternity, does not exist, as a whole, simultaneously, but it is distributed in parts according to the parts of time.
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| At eius aeternitas nihil aliud est quam ipsa. Summa igitur essentia erit divisa per partes secundum temporum distinctiones. Si enim eius aetas per temporum cursus producitur, habet cum ipsis temporibus praesens, praeteritum et futurum. Quid autem aliud est eius vel aetas vel existendi diuturnitas, quam eius aeternitas? Ergo cum eius aeternitas nihil aliud sit quam eius essentia, sicut supra digesta ratio indubitabiliter probat: si eius aeternitas habet praeteritum, praesens et futurum, consequenter quoque /38/ eius essentia habet praeteritum, praesens et futurum.
| But its eternity is nothing else than itself. The supreme Being, then, will be divided into parts, according to the divisions of time. For, if its age is prolonged through periods of time, it has with this time present, past, and future. But what else is its age than its duration of existence, than its eternity? Since, then, its eternity is nothing else than its essence, as considerations set forth above irrefutably prove; if its eternity has past, present, and future, its essence also has, in consequence, past, present, and future.
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| At quod praeteritum est, non est praesens vel futurum; et quod praesens est, non est futurum nec praeteritum; et quod futurum est, non est praeteritum vel praesens. Quomodo igitur stabit, quod supra rationabili et perspicua necessitate claruit, scilicet quia illa summa natura nullo modo composite sed summe simplex est et summe incommutabilis: si aliud et aliod est in diversis temporibus et per tempora distributes habet parses? Aut potius si illa vera sunt, immo quia liquida vera sunt: quomodo haec possibilia sunt? Nullo igitur modo creatrix essentia aut aetas aut aeternitas eius recipit praeteritum vel futurum. Praesens enim quomodo non habet, si vere est? Sed 'fuit' significat praeteritum, et 'erit' futurum. Numquam igitur illa fuit vel erit. Quare non est distincte sicut nec simul tote in diversis singulis temporibus.
| But what is past is not present or future; and what is present is not past or future; and what is future is not past or present. How, then, shall that proposition be valid, which was proved with clear and logical cogency above, namely, that that supreme Nature is in no wise composite, but is supremely simple, supremely immutable?—how shall this be so, if that Nature is one thing, at one time, and another, at another, and has parts distributed according to times? Or rather, if these earlier propositions are true, how can these latter be possible? By no means, then, is past or future attributable to the creative Being, either its age or its eternity. For why has it not a present, if it truly is? But was means past, and will be future. Therefore that Being never was, nor will be. Hence, it does not exist at distinct times, just as it does not exist, as a whole, simultaneously in different individual times.
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| Si igitur sicut discussum est, nec sic est tote in omnibus locis vel temporibus, ut semel sit tote in omnibus et per partes in singulis, nec sic ut tote sit in singulis: manifestum est quondam non est ullo modo tote in omni loco vel tempore.
| If, then, as our discussion has proved, it neither so exists, as a whole, in all places or times that it exists, as a whole, at one time in all, or by parts in individual places and times; nor so that it exists, as a whole, in individual times and places, it is manifest that it does not in any way exist, as a whole, in every time or place.
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| Et quondam similiter pervisum est, quia non sic est in omni loco vel tempore, ut pars sit in omni et pars sit extra omnem locum aut tempus: impossibile est ut sit ubique et semper.
| And, since, in like manner, it has been demonstrated that it neither so exists in every time or place, that a part exists in every, and a part transcends every, place and time, it is impossible that it exists everywhere and always.
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| Nullatenus enim potest intelligi esse ubique et semper, nisi aut tote aut pars. Quod si nequaquam est ubique et semper: aut erit determinate in aliquo loco vel tempore, aut in nullo. Determinate autem eam in aliquo non posse esse iam discussum est. In nullo igitur loco vel tempore, id est nusquam et numquam est. Non enim potest esse nisi aut in omni aut in aliquo.
| For, in no way can it be conceived to exist everywhere and always, except either as a whole or in part. But if it does not at all exist everywhere and always, it will exist either finitely in some place or time, or in none. But it has already been proved, that it cannot exist finitely, in any place or time. In no place or time, that is, nowhere and never does it exist. For it cannot exist, except in every or in some place or time.
|
| Sed rursus cum constet inexpugnabiliter non solum quia est per se et sine principio et sine fine sed quia aliquid sine ea nec usquam nec umquam est: necesse est illam esse ubique et semper. /39/
| But, on the other hand, since it is irrefutably established, not only that it exists through itself, and without beginning and without end, but that without it nothing anywhere or ever exists, it must exist everywhere and always.
|
| 22. QUOMODO SIT IN OMNI ET IN NULLO LOCO ET TEMPORE.
| 22. How [the Supreme Being] exists in every place at every time and in no place at no time.
|
| Quomodo ergo convenient haec tam contraria secundum prolationem, et tam necessaria secundum probationem? Fortasse quodam modo est summa natura in loco vel tempore, quo non prohibetur sic esse simul tota in singulis locis vel temporibus, ut tamen non sint plures totae sed una sola tota, nec eius aetas, quae non est nisi vera aeternitas, non sit dictributa in praeteritum, praesens et futurum.
| How, then, shall these prepositions, that are so necessary according to our exposition, and so necessary according to our proof, be reconciled? Perhaps the supreme Nature exists in place and time in some such way, that it is not prevented from so existing simultaneously, as a whole, in different places or times, that there are not more wholes than one; and that its age, which does not exist, except as true eternity, is not distributed among past, present, and future.
|
| Non enim videntur hac lege loci ac temporis cogi nisi ea quae sic sunt in loco vel tempore, ut loci spatium aut temporis diuturnitatem non excedant. Quare sicut de iis quae huiusmodi sunt, unum idemque totum simul non posse esse totum in diversis locis et temporibus omni veritate asseritur, ita in iis quae huiusmodi non sunt, id ipsum nulla necessitate concluditur.
| For, to this law of space and time, nothing seems to be subject, except the beings which so exist in space or time that they do not transcend extent of space or duration of time. Hence, though of beings of this class it is with all truth asserted that one and the same whole cannot exist simultaneously, as a whole, in different places or times; in the case of those beings which are not of this class, no such conclusion is necessarily reached.
|
| Iure namque dici videtur quod tantum eius rei sit aliquis locus, cuius quantitatem locus circumscribendo continet et continendo circumscribit; et quod eius solum rei sit aliquod tempus, cuius diuturnitatem tempus metiendo aliquomodo terminat et terminando metitur. Quapropter cuius amplitudini aut diuturnitati nulla meta vel a loco vel a tempore opponitur, illi nullum esse locum vel tempus vere proponitur.
| For it seems to be rightly said, that place is predicable only of objects whose magnitude place contains by including it, and includes by containing it; and that time is predicable only of objects whose duration time ends by measuring it, and measures by ending it. Hence, to any being, to whose spatial extent or duration no bound can be set, either by space or time, no place or time is properly attributed.
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| Quoniam namque nec locus illi facit quod locus, nec tempus quod tempus: non irrationabiliter dicitur, quia nullus locus est eius locus, et nullum tempus est eius tempus. Quod vero nullum locum aut tempus habere conspicitur, id profecto nullatenus loci aut temporis legem subire convincitur. Nulla igitur lex loci aut temporis naturam ullam aliquomodo cogit, quam nullus locus ac tempus aliqua continentia claudit.
| For, seeing that place does not act upon it as place, nor time as time, it is not irrational to say, that no place is its place, and no time its time. But, what evidently has no place or time is doubtless by no means compelled to submit to the law of place or time. No law of place or time, then, in any way governs any nature, which no place or time limits by some kind of restraint.
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| Quaenam autem rationalis consideratio omnimoda ratione non excludat, ut creatricem summamque omnium substantiam, quam necesse est alienam esse et liberam a natura et iure omnium quae ipsa de nihilo fecit, ulla loci cohibitio vel temporis includat, cum potius eius potentia, quae nihil /40/ est aliud quam eius essentia, cuncta a se facta sub se continendo concludat? Quomodo quoque non est impudentis imprudentiae dicere quod summae veritatis aut locus circumscribat quantitatem aut tempus metiatur diuturnitatem, quae nullam penitus localis vel temporalis distentionis magnitudinem suscipit vel parvitatem?
| But what rational consideration can by any course of reasoning fail to reach the conclusion, that the Substance which creates and is supreme among all beings, which must be alien to, and free from, the nature and law of all things which itself created from nothing, is limited by no restraint of space or time; since, more truly, its power, which is nothing else than its essence, contains and includes under itself all these things which it created? Is it not impudently foolish, too, to say either, that space circumscribes the magnitude of truth, or, that time measures its duration—truth, which regards no greatness or smallness of spatial or temporal extent at all?
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| Quoniam itaque loci haec est et temporis conditio, ut tantummodo quidquid eorum metis clauditur, nec partium fugiat rationem, vel qualem suscipit locus eius secundum quantitatem, vel qualem patitur tempus eius secundum diuturnitatem, nec ullo modo possit totum a diversis locis vel temporibus simul contineri; quidquid vero loci vel temporis continentia nequaquam coercetur, nulla locorum vel temporum lege ad partium multiplicitatem cogatur, aut praesens esse totum simul pluribus locis aut temporibus prohibeatur; quoniam inquam haec est conditio loci ac temporis: procul dubio summa substantia, quae nulla loci vel temporis continentia cingitur, nulla eorum lege constringitur.
| Seeing, then, that this is the condition of place or time; that only whatever is limited by their bounds neither escapes the law of parts—such as place follows, according to magnitude, or such as time submits to, according to duration—nor can in any way be contained, as a whole, simultaneously by different places or times; but whatever is in no wise confined by the restraint of place or time, is not compelled by any law of places or times to multiplicity of parts, nor is it prevented from being present, as a whole and simultaneously, in more places or times than one—seeing, I say, that this is the condition governing place or time, no doubt the supreme Substance, which is encompassed by no restraint of place or time, is bound by none of their laws.
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| Quare quoniam summam essentiam totam et inevitabilis necessitas exigit nulli loco vel tempori deesse, et nulla ratio loci aut temporis prohibet omni loco vel tempori simul totam adesse: necesse est eam simul totam omnibus et singulis locis et temporibus praesentem esse.
| Hence, since inevitable necessity requires that the supreme Being, as a whole, be lacking to no place or time, and no law of place or time prevents it from being simultaneously in every place or time; it must simultaneously present in every individual place or time.
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| Non enim quia huic loco vel tempori praesens est, idcirco prohibetur illi vel illi loco aut tempori simul et similiter praesens esse; nec quoniam fuit aut est aut erit, ideo aeternitatis eius aliquid evanuit a praesenti tempore cum praeterito quod iam non est, aut transit cum praesenti quod vix est, aut venturum est cum futuro quod nondum est.
| For, because it is present in one place, it is not therefore prevented from being present at the same time, and in like manner in this, or that other, place or time. Nor, because it was, or is, or shall be, has any part of its eternity therefore vanished from the present, with the past, which no longer is; nor does it pass with the present, which is, for an instant; nor is it to come with the future, which is not yet.
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| Nullatenus namque cogitur vel prohibetur lege locorum aut temporum alicubi aut aliquando esse vel non esse, quod nullo modo intra locum vel tempus claudit suum esse. Nam si ipsa summa essentia dicitur esse in loco aut tempore: quamvis de illa et de localibus sive temporalibus naturis una sit prolatio propter loquendi consuetudinem, diversus tamen est intellectus propter rerum dissimilitudinem. In illis namque duo quaedam eadem prolatio significat, id est: quia et praesentia sunt locis et temporibus in quibus esse dicuntur, et quia continentur ab ipsis; in summa vero essentia unum tantum percipitur, id est: quia praesens est, non etiam quia continetur. /41/
| For, by no means is that Being compelled or forbidden by a law of space or time to exist, or not to exist, at any place or time—the Being which, in no wise, includes its own existence in space or time. For, when the supreme Being is said to exist in space or time, although the form of expression regarding it, and regarding local and temporal natures, is the same, because of the usage of language, yet the sense is different, because of the unlikeness of the objects of discussion. For in the latter case the same expression has two meanings, namely: (1) that these objects are present in those places and times in which they are said to be, and (2) that they are contained by these places and times themselves. But in the case of the supreme Being, the first sense only is intended, namely, that it is present; not that it is also contained.
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| Unde si usus loquendi admitteret, convenientius dici videretur esse cum loco vel tempore quam in loco vel tempore. Plus enim significatur contineri aliquid cum dicitur esse in alio, quam cum dicitur esse cum alio.
| If the usage of language permitted, it would, therefore, seem to be more fittingly said, that it exists with place or time, than that it existsin place or time. For the statement that a thing exists in another implies that it is contained, more than does the statement that it exists with another.
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| In nullo itaque loco vel tempore proprie dicitur esse, quia omnino a nullo alio continetur; et tamen in omni loco vel tempore suo quodam modo dici potest esse, quoniam quidquid aliud est ne in nihilum cadat ab ea praesente sustinetur. In omni loco et tempore est, quia nulli abest; et in nullo est, quia nullum locum aut tempus habet. Nec in se recipit distinctiones locorum aut temporum, ut hic vel illic vel alicubi, aut nunc vel tunc vel aliquando; nec secundum labile praesens tempus quo utimur est, aut secundum praeteritum vel futurum fuit aut erit, quoniam haec circumscriptorum et mutabilium propria sunt, quod illa non est;
| In no place or time, then, is this Being properly said to exist, since it is contained by no other at all. And yet it may be said, after a manner of its own, to be in every place or time, since whatever else exists is sustained by its presence, lest it lapse into nothingness. It exists in every place and time, because it is absent from none; and it exists in none, because it has no place or time, and has not taken to itself distinctions of place or time, neither here nor there, nor anywhere, nor then, nor now, nor at any time; nor does it exist in terms of this fleeting present, in which we live, nor has it existed, nor will it exist, in terms of past or future, since these are restricted to things finite and mutable, which it is not.
|
| et tamen haec de ea quodammodo dici possunt, quoniam sic est praesens omnibus circumscriptis et mutabilibus, ac si illa eisdem circumscribatur locis et mutetur temporibus.
| And yet, these properties of time and place can, in some sort, be ascribed to it, since it is just as truly present in all finite and mutable beings as if it were circumscribed by the same places, and suffered change by the same times.
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| Patet itaque quantum sat est ad dissoluendam quae insonabat contrarietatem: qualiter summa omnium essentia ubique et semper et nusquam et numquam, id est in omni et nullo loco aut tempore sit, iuxta diversorum intellectuum concordem veritatem.
| We have sufficient evidence, then, to dispel the contradiction that threatened us; as to how the highest Being of all exists, everywhere and always, and nowhere and never, that is, in every place and time, and in no place or time, according to the consistent truth of different senses of the terms employed.
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| 23. QUOMODO MELIUS INTELLEGI POSSIT ESSE UBIQUE QUAM IN OMNI LOCO.
| 23. How [the Supreme Being] can better be understood to exist everywhere than in every place.
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| Verum cum constet eandem summam naturam non magis esse in omnibus locis quam in omnibus quae sunt, non velut quae contineatur sed quae penetrando cuncta contineat: cur non dicatur esse ubique hoc sensu, ut potius intelligatur esse in omnibus quae sunt, quam tantum in omnibus locis, cum hunc intellectum et rei veritas exhibeat, et ipsa localis verbi proprietas nequaquam prohibeat?
| But, since it is plain that this supreme Nature is not more truly in all places than in all existing things, not as if it were contained by them, but as containing all, by permeating all, why should it not be said to be everywhere, in this sense, that it may be understood rather to be in all existing things, than merely in all places, since this sense is supported by the truth of the fact, and is not forbidden by the proper signification of the word of place?
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| Solemus namque saepe localia verba irreprehensibiliter attribuere rebus, quae nec loca sunt nec circumscriptione locali continentur. Velut si dicam ibi esse intellectum in anima, ubi est rationalitas. Nam cum 'ibi' et 'ubi' localia verba sint, non tamen /42/ locali circumscriptione aut anima continet aliquid, aut intellectus vel rationalitas continentur.
| For we often quite properly apply terms of place to objects which are not places; as, when I say that the understanding is there in the soul, where rationality is. For, though there and where are adverbs of place, yet, by no local limitation, does the mind contain anything, nor is either rationality or understanding contained.
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| Quare summa natura secundum rei veritatem aptius dicitur esse ubique secundum hanc significationem, ut intelligatur esse in omnibus quae sunt, quam si intelligitur tantum in omnibus locis. Et quoniam, sicut supra expositae rationes docent, aliter esse non potest, necesse est eam sic esse in omnibus quae sunt, ut una eademque perfecte tota simul sit in singulis.
| Hence, as regards the truth of the matter, the supreme Nature is more appropriately said to be everywhere, in this sense, that it is in all existing things, than in this sense, namely that it is merely in all places. And since, as the reasons set forth above show, it cannot exist otherwise, it must so be in all existing things, that it is one and the same perfect whole in every individual thing simultaneously.
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| 24. QUOMODO MELIUS INTELLIGI POSSIT ESSE SEMPER QUAM IN OMNI TEMPORE.
| 24. How [the Supreme Being] can better be understood to exist always than at every time.
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| Eandem quoque summam substantiam constat sine principio et fine esse, nec habere praeteritum aut futurum, nec temporale, hoc est labile presens quo nos utimur; quoniam aetas sive aeternitas eius, quae nihil aliud est quam ipsa, immutabilis et sine partibus est. Nonne ergo 'semper', quod videtur designare totum tempus, multo verius si de ilia dicitur, ts intelligitur significare aeternitatem, qua, sibi ipsi numquam est dissimilis, quam temporum varietatem, quae sibi semper in aliquo est non similis?
| It is also evident that this supreme Substance is without beginning and without end; that it has neither past, nor future, nor the temporal, that is, transient present in which we live; since its age, or eternity, which is nothing else than itself, is immutable and without parts. Is not, therefore, the term which seems to mean all time more properly understood, when applied to this Substance, to signify eternity, which is never unlike itself, rather than a changing succession of times, which is ever in some sort unlike itself?
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| Quare si dicitur semper esse: quoniam idem est illi esse et vivere, nihil melius intelligitur quam aeterne esace vel vivere, id est interminabilem vitam perfecte simul totam obtinere. Videtur enim eius aeternitas esse interminabilis vita simul perfecte tota existens.
| Hence, if this Being is said to exist always; since, for it, it is the same to exist and to live, no better sense can be attached to this statement, than that it exists or lives eternally, that is, it possesses interminable life, as a perfect whole at once. For its eternity apparently is an interminable life, existing at once as a perfect whole.
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| Cum enim supra iam satis liqueat quod eadem substantia non sit aliud quam vita sua et aeternitas sua, nec sit aliquo modo terminabilis, nec nisi simul et perfecte tota: quid aliud est vera aeternitas quae illi soli convenit, quam interminabilis vita simul et perfecte tota existens?
| For, since it has already been shown that this Substance is nothing else than its own life and its own eternity, is in no wise terminable, and does not exist, except as at once and perfectly whole, what else is true eternity, which is consistent with the nature of that Substance alone, than an interminable life, existing as at once and perfectly whole?
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| Nam vel hoc solo veram aeternitatem soli illi inesse substantiae, quae sola non facta sed factrix esse inventa est, aperte percipitur: quoniam vera aeternitas principii finisque meta carere intelligitur; quod nulli rerum creatarum convenire, eo ipso quod de nihilo factae sunt, convincitur. /43/
| For this truth is, at any rate, clearly perceived from the single fact that true eternity belongs only to that substance which alone, as we have proved, was not created, but is the creator, since true eternity is conceived to be free from the limitations of beginning and end; and this is proved to be consistent with the nature of no created being, from the very fact that all such have been created from nothing.
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| 25. QUOD NULLIS MUTABILIS SIT ACCIDENTIBUS.
| 25. [The Supreme Being] is not mutable in virtue of any accidents.
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| Sed haec essentia quam patuit omnimode sibi esse eandem substantialiter: nonne aliquando est a se diversa vel accidentaliter? Verum quomodo est summe incommutabilis, si per accidentia potest non dicam esse sed vel intelligi variabilis? Et econtra, quomodo non est particeps accidentis, cum hoc ipsum quod maior est omnibus aliis naturis et quod illis dissimilis est, illi videatur accidere? Sed quid repugnant quorundam qua, accidentia dicuntur susceptibilitas et naturalis incommutabilitas, si ox eorum assumptione nulla substantiam consequatur variabilitas?
| But does not this Being, which has been shown to exist as in every way substantially identical with itself, sometimes exist as different from itself, at any rate accidentally? But how is it supremely immutable, if it can, I will not say, be, but, be conceived of, as variable by virtue of accidents? And, on the other hand, does it not partake of accident, since even this very fact that it is greater than all other natures and that it is unlike them seems to be an accident in its case (illi accidere)? But what is the inconsistency between susceptibility to certain facts, called accidents, and natural immutability, if from the undergoing of these accidents the substance undergoes no change?
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| Omnium quippe quae accidentia dicuntur, alia non nisi cum aliqua participantis variatione adesse et abesse posse intelliguntur, ut omnes colores; alia nullam omnino vel accedendo vel recedendo mutationem circa id de quo dicuntur efficere noscuntur, ut quaedam relationes. Constat namque quia homini post annum prasentem nascituro nec maior nec minor nec aequalis sum nec similis. Omnes autem has relationes utique cum natus fuerit, sine omni mei mutatione ad illum habere potero et amittere, secundum quod crescet vel per qualitates diversas mutabitur.
| For, of all the facts, called accidents, some are understood not to be present or absent without some variation in the subject of the accident—all colors, for instance—while others are known not to effect any change in a thing either by occurring or not occurring—certain relations, for instance. For it is certain that I am neither older nor younger than a man who is not yet born, nor equal to him, nor like him. But I shall be able to sustain and to lose all these relations toward him, as soon as he shall have been born, according as he shall grow, or undergo change through divers qualities.
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| Palam itaque fit, quia eorum quae accidentia dicuntur, quaedam aliquatenus attrahant commutabilitatem, quaedam vero nullatenus subtrahant immutabilitatem.
| It is made clear, then, that of all those facts, called accidents, a part bring some degree of mutability in their train, while a part do not impair at all the immutability of that in whose case they occur.
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| Sicut igitur summa natura accidentibus mutationem efficientibus numquam in sua simplicitate locum tribuit, sic secundum ea quae nullatenus summae incommutabilitati repugnant, aliquando dici aliquid non respuit, et tamen aliquid eius essentiae unde ipsa variabilis intelligi possit non accidit.
| Hence, although the supreme Nature in its simplicity has never undergone such accidents as cause mutation, yet it does not disdain occasional expression in terms of those accidents which are in no wise inconsistent with supreme immutability; and yet there is no accident respecting its essence, whence it would be conceived of, as itself variable.
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| Unde hoc quoque concludi potest, quia nullius accidentis susceptibilis est. Quippe quemadmodum illa accidentia, quae mutationem aliquam accedendo vel recedendo faciunt, ipso suo effectu vere accidere rei quam mutant perpenduntur: sic illa quae a simili effectu deficiunt, improprie dici accidentia deprehenduntur. Sicut ergo semper sibi est omni modo eadem substantialiter, ita numquam est a se diversa ullo modo vel accidentaliter. Sed quoquo modo sese habeat ratio de proprietate nominis accidentium: /44/ illud sine dubio verum est, quia de summe incommutabili natura nihil potest dici, unde mutabilis possit intelligi.
| Whence this conclusion, also, may be reached, that it is susceptible of no accident; since, just as those accidents, which effect some change by their occurrence or non-occurrence, are by virtue of this very effect of theirs regarded as being true accidents, so those facts, which lack a like effect, are found to be improperly called accidents. Therefore, this Essence is always, in every way, substantially identical with itself; and it is never in any way different from itself, even accidentally. But, however it may be as to the proper signification of the term accident, this is undoubtedly true, that of the supremely immutable Nature no statement can be made, whence it shall be conceived of as mutable
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| 26. QUOMODO ILLA DICENDA SIT ESSE SUBSTANTIA, ET QUOD SIT EXTRA OMNEM SUBSTANTIAM, ET SINGULARITER SIT QUIDQUID EST.
| 26. In what sense [the Supreme Being] is to be called substance. It is beyond every substance. It is uniquely whatever it is.
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| Sed si ratum est quod de huius naturae simplicitate perspectum est: quomodo substantia est? Nam cum omnis substantia admixtionis differen tiarum vel mutationis accidentium sit susceptibilis: huius immutabilis sinceritas omnimodae admixtioni sive mutationi est inaccessibilis.
| But, if what we have ascertained concerning the simplicity of this Nature is established, how is it substance? For, though every substance is susceptible of admixture of difference, or, at any rate, susceptible of mutation by accidents, the immutable purity of this Being is inaccessible to admixture or mutation, in any form.
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| Quomodo ergo obtinebitur eam esse quamlibet substantiam, nisi dicatur substantia pro essentia, et sic sit extra sicut est supra omnem substantiam? Nam quantum illud esse, quod per se est quidquid est, et de nihilo facit omne aliud esse, diversum est ab eo esse, quod per aliud fit de nihilo quidquid est: tantum omnino distat summa substantia ab iis quae non sunt idem quod ipsa. Cumque ipsa sola omnium naturarum habeat a se sine alterius naturae auxilio esse quidquid est: quomodo non est singulariter absque suae creaturae consortio quidquid ipsa est?
| How, then, shall it be maintained that it is a substance of any kind, except as it is called substance for being, and so transcends, as it is above, every substance? For, as great as is the difference between that Being, which is through itself whatever it is, and which creates every other being from nothing, and a being, which is made whatever it is through another, from nothing; so much does the supreme Substance differ from these beings, which are not what it is. And, since it alone, of all natures, derives from itself, without the help of another nature, whatever existence it has, is it not whatever it is individually and apart from association with its creatures?
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| Unde si quando illi est cum aliis nominis alicuius communio, valde procul dubio intelligenda est diversa significatio. /45/
| Hence, if it ever shares any name with other beings, doubtless a very different signification of that name is to be understood in its case.
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| 27. QUOD NON CONTINEATUR IN COMMUNI TRACTATU SUBSTANTIARUM, ET TAMEN SIT SUBSTANTIA ET INDIVIDUUS SPIRITUS.
| 27. [The Supreme Being] is not included in the usual classification of substances; nevertheless, it is a substance and an individual spirit.
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| Constat igitur quia illa substantia nullo communi substantiarum tractatu includitur, a cuius essentiali communione omnis natura excluditur. Nempe cum omnis substantia tractetur aut esse universalis, quae pluribus substantiis essentialiter communis est, ut hominem esse commune est singulis hominibus; aut esse individua, quae universalem essentiam communem habet cum aliis, quemadmodum singuli homines commune habent cum singulis, ut homines sint: quomodo aliquis summam naturam in aliarum substantiarum tractatu contineri intelligit, quae nec in plures substantias se dividit, nec cum alia aliqua per essentialem communionem se colligit?
| It is, therefore, evident that in any ordinary treatment of substance, this Substance cannot be included, from sharing in whose essence every nature is excluded. Indeed, since every substance is treated either as universal, i. e., as essentially common to more than one substance, as being a man is common to individual men; or as individual, having a universal essence in common with others, as individual men have in common with individual men the fact that they are men; does any one conceive that, in the treatment of other substances, that supreme Nature is included, which neither divides itself into more substances than one, nor unites with any other, by virtue of a common essence?
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| Quoniam tamen ipsa non solum certissime existit sed etiam summe omnium existit, et cuiuslibet rei essentia dici solet substantia: profecto si quid digne dici potest, non prohibetur dici substantia.
| Yet, seeing that it not only most certainly exists, but exists in the highest degree of all things; and since the essence of anything is usually called its substance, doubtless if any worthy name can be given it, there is no objection to our calling it substance.
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| Et quoniam non noscitur dignior essentia quam spiritus aut corpus, et ex his spiritus dignior est quam corpus: utique eadem asserenda est esse spiritus, non corpus. Quoniam autem nec ullae partes sunt eiusdem spiritus, nec plures esse possunt eiusmodi spiritus, necesse est ut sit omnino individuus spiritus. Quoniam enim sicut supra constat nec partibus est compositus, nec ullis differentiis vel accidentibus intelligi potest esse mutabilis: impossibile est ut qualibet sectione sit divisibilis.
| And since no worthier essence than spirit and body is known, and of these, spirit is more worthy than body, it must certainly be maintained that this Being is spirit and not body. But, seeing that one spirit has not any parts, and there cannot be more spirits than one of this kind, it must, by all means, be an indivisible spirit. For since, as is shown above, it is neither compounded of parts, nor can be conceived of as mutable, through any differences or accidents, it is impossible that it is divisible by any form of division.
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| 28. QUOD IDEM SPIRITUS SIMPLICITER SIT, ET CREATA ILLI COMPARATA NON SINT.
| 28. This Spirit exists in an unqualified sense; compared to it created things do not exist.
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| Videtur ergo consequi ex praecedentibus quod iste spiritus, qui sic suo quodam mirabiliter singulari et singulariter mirabili modo est, quadam /46/ ratione solus sit, alia vero quaecumque videntur esse, huic collata non sint.
| It seems to follow, then, from the preceding considerations, that the Spirit which exists in so wonderfully singular and so singularly wonderful a way of its own is in some sort unique; while other beings which seem to be comparable with it are not so.
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| Si enim diligenter intendatur, ille solus uidebitur simpliciter et perfecte et absolute esse, alia vero omnia fere non esse et vix esse. Quaniam namque idem spiritus propter incommutabilem aeternitatem suam nullo modo secundum aliquem motum dici potest quia fuit vel erit sed simpliciter est; nec mutabiliter est aliquid quod aliquando aut non fuit aut non erit; neque non est quod aliquando foit aut erit sed quidquid est semel et simul et interminabiliter est; quoniam inquam huiusmodi est eius esse: iure ipse simpliciter et absolute et perfecte dicitur esse.
| For, by diligent attention it will be seen that that Spirit alone exists simply, and perfectly, and absolutely; while all other beings are almost non-existent, and hardly exist at all. For, seeing that of this Spirit, because of its immutable eternity, it can in no wise be said, in terms of any alteration, that it was or will be, but simply that it is; it is not now, by mutation, anything which it either was not at any time, or will not be in the future. Nor does it fail to be now what it was, or will be, at any time; but, whatever it is, it is, once for all, and simultaneously, and interminably. Seeing, I say, that its existence is of this character, it is rightly said itself to exist simply, and absolutely, and perfectly.
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| Quoniam vero alia omnia mutabiliter secundum aliquid aliquando aut fuerunt aut crunt quod non sunt, aut sunt quod aliquando non fuerunt uel non erunt; et quoniam hoc quia fuerunt iam non est, illud autem scilicet quia erunt nondum est, et hoc quod in labili brevissimoque et uix existente praesenti sunt vix est; quoniam ergo tam mutabiliter sunt: non immerito negantur simpliciter et perfecte et absolute esse, et asseruntur fere non esse et vix esse.
| But since, on the other hand, all other beings, in accordance with some cause, have at some time been, or will be, by mutation, what they are not now; or, are what they were not, or will not be, at some time; and, since this former existence of theirs is no longer a fact; and that future existence is not yet a fact; and their existence in a transient, and most brief, and scarcely existing, present is hardly a fact—since, then, they exist in such mutability, it is not unreasonably denied that they exist simply, and perfectly, and absolutely; and it is asserted that they are almost non-existent, that they scarcely exist at all.
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| Deinde, cum omnia quaecumque aliud sunt quam ipse, de non esse venerint ad esse non per se sed per aliud; et cum de esse redeant ad non esse quantum ad se, nisi sustineantur per aliud: quomodo illis convenit simpiiciter aut perfecte sive absolute esse et non magis vix esse aut fere non esse?
| Again, since all beings, which are other than this Spirit himself, have come from non-existence to existence, not through themselves, but through another; and, since they return from existence to non-existence, so far as their own power is concerned, unless they are sustained through another being, is it consistent with their nature to exist simply, or perfectly, or absolutely, and not rather to be almost non-existent.
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| Cumque esse solius eiusdem ineffabilis spiritus nullo modo intelligi possit aut ex non esse inceptum, aut aliquem pati posse ex eo quod est in non esse defectum; et quidquid ipse est non sit per aliud quam per se, id est per hoc, quod ipse est: nonne huius esse merito solum intelligitur simplex perfectumque et absolutum?
| And since the existence of this ineffable Spirit alone can in no way be conceived to have taken inception from non-existence, or to be capable of sustaining any deficiency rising from what is in non-existence; and since, whatever he is himself, he is not through another than himself, that is, than what he is himself, ought not his existence alone to be conceived of as simple, and perfect, and absolute?
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| Quod vero sic simpliciter et omnimoda ratione solum est perfectum, simplex et absolutum: id nimirum quodam modo iure dici potest solum esse. Et econtra, quidquid per superiorem rationem nec simpliciter nec perfecte nec absolute esse sed vix esse aut fere non esse cognoscitur: id utique aliquo modo recte non esse dicitur.
| But what is thus simply, and on every ground, solely perfect, simple, and absolute, this may very certainly be justly said to be in some sort unique. And, on the other hand, whatever is known to exist through a higher cause, and neither simply, nor perfectly, nor absolutely, but scarcely to exist, or to be almost non-existent—this assuredly may be rightly said to be in some sort non-existent.
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| Secundum hanc igitur rationem solus ille creator spiritus est, et omnia creata non sunt; nec tamen omnino non: sunt, quia per illum, qui solus absolute est, de nihilo aliquid facta sunt. /47/
| According to this course of reasoning, then, the creative Spirit alone exists, and all creatures are non-existent; yet, they are not wholly non-existent, because, through that Spirit which alone exists absolutely, they have been made something from nothing.
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